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This paper explores the effect of transaction costs on aggregate supply and 
demand and marketed surplus.  A five-good non-separable household model is 
used to illustrate the effect of transaction costs on a generic African household.  
Then, the paper examines the aggregate behavior of a market consisting of 50 
such households with varying production capacities.  The simulations reveal that 
transaction costs not only decrease market surplus but that they can substantially 
reduce the elasticity of supply and demand.  Under other circumstances (when 
almost all households are net sellers), transaction costs can also make supply 
and demand more elastic.  Finally, the results show that transaction costs 
generally increase the price elasticity of marketed surplus.  The implications for 






1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Studies of the determinants of agricultural supply and marketed surplus generally 
distinguish between price and non-price, or structural, factors.  Structural factors 
such as transportation infrastructure, irrigation, and literacy are generally 
assumed to shift the supply schedule outward (see Binswanger et al, 1987 and 
Chibber, 1989).  This paper shows that, in the case of food markets in developing 
countries, improved transportation infrastructure should not only shift agricultural 
supply outward but it should increase the elasticity of agricultural supply.     
 
Transportation costs are simply the most concrete form of transaction costs, 
defined as the monetary and/or opportunity costs associated with carrying out a 
sale or a purchase.   Other transaction costs include those associated with 
finding a buyer (or seller), negotiating a contract, financing the payment, and 
enforcing the transaction agreement.  Models of household behavior generally 
exclude transaction costs by assuming that the household faces a unique 
exogenous price in each market, a price at which it can buy and sell (see 
Yotopolous, et al. 1976; Singh et al, 1986).  This assumption simplifies the 
analysis because production decisions are unaffected by (or “separable” from) 
consumption decisions.  When transaction costs are introduced, the wedge 






1.  In particular, it introduces inequalities into the model: with 
transaction costs, household shadow prices are less than or equal to the buying 
price and greater than or equal to the selling price.    
 
In a pioneering study, de Janvry, Fafchamp, and Sadoulet (1991) examine the 
effect of “missing markets” using a household model calibrated to represent a 
generic African household.  They show that if households cannot buy or sell food 
or labor, the supply of cash crops become more inelastic.  In the absence of food 
markets, for example, households must be self-sufficient
2 in food, limiting their 
ability to reallocate land and labor to cash crops.  In their model, the net position 
of the household for each commodity (whether it is a buyer, a seller, or self-
sufficient) is imposed exogenously.  Transaction costs are used to explain why a 
market might be “missing”, but they are not part of the model.  This approach 
avoids the use of inequalities but is only valid only for small price changes, since 
large changes may cause the household to change net position.  Furthermore, 
the model does not demonstrate the effect of changes in transaction costs on 
household behavior. 
 
                                                       
1 Non-separability can result from other factors as well, such as market 
power, risk, and imperfect substitutability between home goods and purchased goods 
(see Roe and Graham-Tomasi, 1986 and de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1996).   
2 Throughout this paper, we use "self-sufficient" as a synonym for autarkic, 





At the national level, Delgado (1992) argues that high transport costs make 
starchy staples non-tradable, so the competitiveness of exports may be 
constrained by low productivity in wage-good food crops.  At the household level, 
Goetz (1992) uses a switching regression model to demonstrate that transaction 
costs affect farmer decisions whether to buy, sell, or not participate in the market. 
 Jayne (1994) and Omamo (1998) show that high transportation costs help to 
explain farmer decisions to grow food rather than cash crops, even if the latter 
generates higher returns (where returns are calculated using market prices rather 
than farm-level opportunity costs).  Lofgren and Robinson (1999) use mixed 
complementarity programming (MCP) to develop a household model in which the 
net position in each market is endogenous.  They embed models of small and 
large farms in a computable general equilibrium model to study market 
interactions in the presence of transaction costs. 
 
This paper examines the effect of transaction costs on the own-price elasticities 
of demand, supply, and marketed surplus.   It begins with a simple graphic 
analysis to illustrate the effect of transaction costs on household supply and 
demand.  Next, a model is presented that simulates the behavior of a utility-
maximizing household facing transaction costs, using MCP as proposed by 
Lofgren and Robinson.  The model is used to explore the effects of transaction 





the effect of transaction costs on aggregate market behavior is examined by 
modeling the combined effect of a large number of households, each facing 
transaction costs.   
 
The results show that transaction costs generate discontinuous behavior in which 
the household is a net seller over a certain market price range, self-sufficient 
over a (lower) price range, and a net buyer over another (still lower) price range.  
Extending the model to represent market behavior, we show that transaction 
costs shift both supply and demand, as well as affecting price elasticities.  In 
most cases, transaction costs dramatically reduce the own-price elasticities of 
aggregate supply and demand.  Somewhat surprisingly, the study also finds that 
transaction costs can, under different but plausible circumstances, make supply 
and demand more elastic.  Another unexpected result is that even when 
transaction costs make supply and demand less elastic, they generally make the 
marketed surplus more price elastic.  Thus, the high transaction costs that 
characterize food markets in developing countries can explain high rates of food 
self-sufficiency as well as inelastic supply and demand. On the other hand, high 





2.  INTUITIVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
 
Suppose that a household must incur a transaction cost, t, in order to sell or buy 
a commodity.  This may be interpreted as the cost of transporting goods between 
the farm and the market and any other costs associated with finding a 
buyer/seller and negotiating an agreement.  To simplify the exposition, we 
assume that transaction costs are equal for buyers and sellers and that they are 
proportionate to the volume bought or sold
3.  The transaction costs (t) drive a 
wedge between the exogenous market price (pm) and the endogenous household 
shadow price (ph), but the direction of the wedge depends on whether the 
household buys or sells the commodity.  For deficit households, ph = pm + t, and 
for surplus households, ph = pm - t.  At the same time, the net position of a 
household depends on the relationship between the shadow price (ph) and the 
autarky shadow price (ASP), defined as the shadow price at which the household 
is self-sufficient.  The household will be a net buyer (seller) if ph < ASP (ph > 
ASP).  Combining these two sets of relationships, we find that for net buyers, ph 
= pm + t < ASP or (rearranging terms) pm < ASP - t.  By the same logic, for net 
sellers, ph = pm - t  > ASP or pm > ASP + t.  A third possibility is that ASP - t < pm 
> ASP + t (or, equivalently, pm + t > ASP > pm - t).  In this range, transaction costs 
                                                       
3 The model presented later can easily incorporate transaction costs that 





make it unprofitable for the household to buy or sell so the household is self-
sufficient and ph = ASP
4.  
 
Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) illustrate the effect of transaction costs on 
household decision-making with Figure 1 which shows household supply and 
demand as a function of the household shadow price (ph).  In this figure, pm + t > 
ASP > pm - t so the household is self-sufficient (S=D=Q0).  For small shifts in 
household supply or demand, the ASP changes but the household remains self-
sufficient.  Only if the shift is large enough to push ASP above pm + t (below pm - 
t) does the household becomes a net buyer (net seller).  For small changes in 
market prices, the household remains self-sufficient and production and 
consumption are unchanged.  In fact, for any market price between ASP + t and 
ASP - t, the household shadow price is unchanged, so production and 
consumption are also unchanged.  Only if the market price moves out of this 
range does trade become profitable.  Specifically, if the market price falls below 
ASP - t, the household will begin to buy and if the market price rises above ASP 
+ t, the household starts to sell. 
                                                       
4 These relationships are analagous to those found in international trade in 
which (in the absence of distortions) the domestic price of a tradable good is bounded by 
the CIF and FOB prices, but may not be equal to either if the country is self-sufficient in 






Another way to look at transaction costs is to graph household supply and 
demand as a function of the market price (pm), as shown in Figure 2.  Without 
transaction costs, the household supply and demand schedules are represented 
by S(pm, t=0) and D(pm, t=0), respectively.   In this case, the household would be 
a net seller (buyer) when pm > ASP (pm < ASP).  With transaction costs, the 
household will only be a net seller when ph > ASP implying that pm > ASP + t.  
The price at which selling begins has shifted up by t.  In fact, at any market price 
pm + t, the net seller behaves as if the price were pm and there were no 
transaction costs.  This implies that the whole upper portions of the original 
supply and demand curves shift upward by t.  Likewise, the household will not 
buy until ph < ASP implying that pm < ASP - t.  By the same logic, the lower 
portion of both curves shifts down by t.  In the region where ASP - t < pm < ASP + 
t, the household is self-sufficient and unaffected by market prices.  This is 
represented graphically by a vertical line where supply and demand coincide.   
I will refer to this figure as the “reflected-Y” diagram, since it resembles a Y on a 
mirror.  It illustrates the intuitive idea that at high market prices, the household is 
a net seller, at low prices a net buyer, and at a range of intermediate prices, the 
household is self-sufficient.  The length of the vertical portion of the diagram is 







over which the household is self-sufficient.  Higher transaction costs also reduce 
the volume of trade for any given market price
5. 
 
It is important to note that kinks in Figure 2 do not represent any discontinuity or 
irrationality in behavior with respect to household shadow price.  Rather they are 
the result of a discontinuous relationship between the household shadow price 
and market prices.  In particular, transaction costs introduce a wedge between 
the two that changes sign when the household switches from buying to selling.  
Transaction costs also create a range of market prices over which the household 
supply equals household demand and neither is affected by small changes in 
market prices.   
 
Having provided an intuitive understanding of the effect of transaction costs on 
household supply and demand, we now simulate the effect of transaction costs 
on household supply and demand using a formal household model. Household 
supply and demand, we now simulate the effect of transaction costs on 
household supply and demand using a formal household model.  
                                                       
5 The reflected-Y diagram can also be used to describe national supply and 
demand as a function of world prices.  At high world prices, the country is an exporter, at 
low prices an importer, and over a range of intermediate world prices, it is self-sufficient. 





3.  MODELING AN INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLD FACING TRANSACTION 
COSTS 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL  
 
The underlying model involves the maximization of utility subject to exogenous 
market prices, production technology, and transaction costs.  Since the 
constraints relating prices and transaction costs are inequalities, the first-order 
conditions are described by the set of Kuhn-Tucker conditions, consisting of both 
equalities and inequalities.  It is these first-order conditions that constitute the 
household model as programmed (see Lofgren and Robinson, 1998). 
 
The model consists of six sets of equations that describe household behavior 
with regard to five goods: food, a cash crop, manufactured goods, fertilizer, and 
labor.  Although the index i represents all five goods, the parameters are set to 
ensure that there is no production of manufactured goods and no consumption of 
the cash crop or fertilizer
6.   
 
The first block specifies the production of food and cash crops (qi) and the 
demand for fertilizer and labor (-qi) as a function of output and input prices (phi).  
                                                       
6 These restrictions are not necessary to solve the model; they are only 
intended to reduce the parameter requirements and make the model fit the stylized facts 
of rural households in developing countries.  An obvious extension of the model would 





The functional form adopted here is derived from the generalized Leontif profit 
function.  Thus, the parameter describing output supply and input demand are 
theoretically consistent with each other, obeying symmetry and zero-degree 
homogeneity in prices.   
 
The second block specifies the consumer demand for food, manufactured goods, 
and labor (leisure) as a function of prices and income.  We use the Almost Ideal 
Demand System which (except for the linearized price index) corresponds to a 
translog cost function.  Again, the constraints associated with demand theory are 
imposed on the parameters. 
 
The third block of equations defines full income as the total value of production 
and labor time endowment minus the total cost of production including family 
labor.  This is equivalent to the net income from production (including the value of 
home produced food) plus the value of leisure time.  Because qi describes output 
supply and negative input demand, Óqiphi  is equal to full income.  
 
The fourth block of equations ensures commodity balance: the sum of production 
and market demand for each good must be equal to consumption plus market 
sales.  The fifth block is a set of inequalities that require that the household 





transaction costs (pm + t).  Similarly, the sixth block specifies that the household 
shadow price (ph) be greater than or equal to the market price minus transaction 
costs (pm - t).   
 
The model is written in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) and solved 
using mixed complementarity programming (MCP), an algorithm for solving 
problems expressed as a set of equalities and inequalities (see Brooke et al., 
1992 and Rutherford, 1995).  MCP requires the programmer to specify one 
complementary variable to be associated with each inequality constraint
7.  In this 
model, the complementary variables linked to the fifth and sixth blocks are 
market purchases and market sales, respectively.  The economic intuition is that 
if the autarky shadow price (ASP) is greater than the buying price (pm + t), then 
inequality (6) is binding and purchases must be strictly positive.  Similarly, if ASP 
< pm - t, inequality (7) is binding and sales are strictly positive.  If pm - t < ASP < 
pm + t, neither (6) nor (7) is binding, and the household neither buys nor sells, 
becoming self-sufficient.  
 
                                                       
7 MCP solves a Asquare@ system of equations, implying that there is no 
objective function and the number of equations is equal to the number of endogenous 
variables.  A binding inequality is equivalent to an equality in the system, while a non-
binding inequality is equivalent to omitting the equation from the system.  In order to 
maintain a balance between equations and endogenous variables, a variable (known as 
the complementary variable) must drop out of the system by becoming zero when the 
inequality is non-binding.  Likewise, it must enter the system by becoming strictly 





GAMS gives the solution for one set of values of the exogenous variables, but we 
are interested in tracing out the supply and demand schedules over a range of 
market prices for food.  For this reason, a price “subscript” is added to all the 
endogenous variables in the model so that solutions are found simultaneously for 
various values of the market price for food (these subscripts are not shown in 
Annex A to simplify the exposition).   
 
CALIBRATION OF THE MODEL  
 
The demand functions are generated by specifying a reference price and quantity 
for each of the three consumption goods, as well as the income and price 
elasticities at those points.  The relative prices and quantities are selected to 
represent values typical for a small farm household in sub-Saharan Africa.   The 
quantities are expressed in kilograms (except labor which is expressed in 
person-days).  Similarly, the income and price elasticities of demand are within 
the range of estimates from sub-Saharan Africa
8.  The reference price and 
quantities are shown in Table 1, while the income and price elasticities of 
demand are shown in Tables 2. 
                                                       
8 The supply elasticity for food is assumed to be 1.0, higher than most 
empirical estimates.  The reason for this is that econometric studies estimate the 
elasticity of supply with respect to market price (pm), whereas the elasticities in the model 
are with respect to household shadow prices (ph).  In the presence of transaction costs, 
the household-level elasticities will generally be larger (in absolute value) than the 






Output supply and input demand are specified at a reference price, as well as the 
matrix of desired output-supply-input-demand elasticities at that point
9.  The 
constants in the supply equation are then set to ensure that output supply and 
input demand curves pass through the reference price and quantity points.  The 
matrix of output supply elasticities and input demand elasticities is shown in 
Table 3.   
 
Although the model can represent different transaction costs for each commodity, 
the results presented here incorporate transaction costs only in the market for 
food.  Transaction costs are generally most important in the case of staple foods 
because the value/weight ratio is lower than for cash crops, fertilizer, and 
manufactured goods.  Transaction costs of 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3 are used, 
representing 10, 20, and 30 percent of the autarky shadow price for food.   
 
RESULTS 
Figure 3 shows the results of the household model for different market prices 
(solved in increments of 0.1) with each line representing a different level of 
                                                       
9 Because it is difficult to select a priori parameters to satisfy symmetry and 
homogeneity, I use linear programming to find the matrix of supply coefficients that a) 
satisfies the desired own-price elasticities, b) satisfies symmetry and homogeneity, and 
c) minimizes the sum of squared errors between the desired and actual cross-price 





transaction costs.  When t=0, supply and demand form the standard AX” 
diagram, but when t > 0, they trace out the reflected-Y diagram described in the 
previous section.  The vertical section of the diagram describes the price range 
over which supply and demand are equal, implying self-sufficiency.  In this range, 
ASP - t < pm < ASP + t and transaction costs prevent the household from 
participating in the market.  As a result, small changes in market prices in this 
range have no effect on the household shadow price and hence on household 
behavior.  At market prices above (below) this range, the household becomes a 
net seller (buyer) and both supply and demand respond to prices.   
 
The elasticity of supply and demand with respect to market prices are affected by 
transaction costs in several ways.  First, over the range ASP - t > pm > ASP + t, 
the household is self-sufficient so the elasticities of supply and demand with 
respect to market prices are zero.  Second, transaction costs affect the elasticity 
even outside this price range because a one percent change in the market price 
(pm) corresponds to a different percentage change in the household shadow 
price (ph).  Specifically, if the household is a net seller (buyer), transaction costs 
make supply and demand more (less) elastic with respect to market price.  Third, 
transaction costs change the slopes of the supply and demand curves at a given 
market price (unless they are linear), as well as the quantities supplied and 





4.  MODELING AGGREGATE MARKET BEHAVIOR WITH TRANSACTION 
COSTS 
 
Instead of a single household, we now assume that there are a number of 
households that carry out all purchases and sales in a single market place and 
that there are costs to transporting goods to and from this market.  The 
household differ in their fixed factors, such as land and farm equipment, so they 
have different output supply schedules.  These differences result in variation 
across households in production, income, and demand.  Thus, the value of ASP 




The aggregate market behavior of 50 households is simulated by placing the 
household model within a loop with 50 iterations, so that equilibrium values of the 
endogenous variables are calculated for each household.   Household variation 
in fixed factors of production is represented by multiplying the constant in the 
food supply equation by a term, è, that is distributed N(1, 0.25).  The distribution 
of è across real farm households will not necessarily be normal or even 






It is assumed that a) only the food supply function varies across households, b) 
the other supply parameters remain unchanged, c) only the food market is 
subject to transaction costs, and d) transaction costs in the food market are 
constant across households
10.  Although none of these assumptions is required 
by the model, they simplify the interpretation of the results.  Aggregate demand 
and supply are calculated as the sum of household demand and supply, 




Figure 4 shows the aggregate supply and demand schedules with different levels 
of transaction costs.  The graph demonstrates that transactions costs make 
supply and demand more inelastic, but the effect is not uniform across the range 
of prices.  Toward the upper end of the price range, transaction costs have little 
effect on the slope of the supply and demand curves.  This is because at high 
prices, most households are participating in the market as net sellers and are 
thus responding to price changes.  Instead, transaction costs simply shift the 
supply curve back and the demand curve out
11.  Transaction costs shift supply 
                                                       
10 As pointed out by Chris Delgado (personal communication), similar 
results can be obtained by assuming that transaction costs vary across households due 
to spatial dispersion of farms and different distances to the market. 
11 The vertical axis represents market prices.  Since transaction costs affect 





back because they reduce the selling price (pm - t) that farmers receive for any 
given market price.  It is less obvious why transaction costs increase food 
demand, since the buying price of food is raised by transaction costs.  The 
explanation is that, in this price range, most households are net sellers, for whom 
the buying price is not relevant.  The shadow price of food for net sellers is the 
selling price, which is lowered by transaction costs.  The lower shadow price of 
food reduces the opportunity cost of consuming rather than selling food.  
 
Toward the lower end of the price range, transaction costs again have little effect 
on the slopes of the curves because most households are net buyers and thus 
respond to price changes.  Transaction costs cause demand to shift back by 
increasing the prices household pay for food, and they shift supply outward by 
increasing the value of household food production.  Since most households are 
net buyers in this price range, higher transaction costs raise the shadow price of 
food and encourage production to meet household needs.  
 
In the middle price range, the supply and demand curves shift less because 
some are net buyers and others are net sellers, so transaction costs have mixed 
effects on household shadow prices.  On the other hand, aggregate supply and 
                                                                                                                                                              






demand become more inelastic because a large number of households are self-
sufficient in this price range.  
 
Figure 5 shows the supply and demand elasticities as a function of the size of 
transaction costs and the market price, where price is plotted on the vertical axis 
to aid comparison with previous figures.  Over most of the price range, higher 
transaction costs are associated with more inelastic supply and demand, but the 
size of the effect varies with the price.  This effect is greatest when the market 
price (pm) is near the center of the distribution of household autarky shadow 
prices (ASP).   
 
The crossing lines at the top of Figure 5 reveal that, at high prices, transaction 
costs can actually make supply and demand more elastic.  This is because, in 
the presence of transaction costs, a given percentage change in the market price 
will result in a larger percentage change in the household shadow price
12.  This 
effect applies to all net sellers, but only becomes dominant at high prices where 
few households are self-sufficient.  This effect does not apply to net buyers, for 
whom the market price is less than the household shadow price.  It is 
conceivable but unlikely that transaction costs could make supply or demand 
                                                       
12 This corresponds to the rule that, with fixed marketing margins, the 
elasticity of supply with respect to the wholesale price will be greater than the elasticity 





more elastic for net buyers (it would require unusual curvature in supply and 
demand: M
2qd/Mp
2 > 0 and M
2qs/Mp
2 < 0). 
 
Figure 6 confirms that the proportion of food-self-sufficient households is highest 
in the middle price range, where the center of the distribution of household ASP 
values is found.  In addition, the figure demonstrates that, for any given market 
price, higher transaction costs are associated with a higher proportion of self-
sufficient households.  If the transaction costs are large enough, there is a price 
range over which pm + t > ASP > pm - t for all households, implying that none of 
the households participates in the market.
13  In this case, the aggregate supply 
and demand elasticities are zero. 
 
Figure 7 shows the absolute value of the elasticity of market surplus (or deficit) 
with respect to market price at different levels of transaction costs.  The 
elasticities for the middle range of market prices are not shown because they are 
either undefined (when market surplus changes from zero to non-zero) or very 
large.  What is striking about this graph is that for a given market price, higher 
transaction costs are associated with higher price elasticities of marketed 
surplus.  In other words, even though transaction costs reduce the level of 
                                                       
13 With an infinite number of households, there would always be some 
households whose autarky shadow price (ASP) is outside the range associated with self-
sufficiency, but we simulate a finite number of households (50) resulting in a finite range 





marketed surplus, they increase the price elasticity of market surplus.  The 
elasticity of marketed surplus (MS) is defined as (MMS/Mp)(p/MS).  The first 
term, the partial derivative of marketed surplus with respect to price, changes 
only slightly due to curvature in the supply and demand schedules.  In fact, given 
the normal curvature (M
2qd/Mp
2 < 0 and M
2qs/Mp
2 > 0), we expect the partial to 
be somewhat larger in absolute value under transaction costs.  More importantly, 
however, the level of marketed surplus (MS) is lower with transaction costs.  
Since MS appears in the denominator, this tends to raise the elasticity of market 





5.  SUMMARY 
 
This paper explores the effect of transportation costs and other transaction costs 
on supply, demand, and marketed surplus.  It shows that these "structural" 
factors influence household and market behavior by changing the household 
shadow prices that correspond to a given market price.  In doing so, transaction 
costs can cause a household to become self-sufficient, neither buying from nor 
selling to the market over a certain market price range.  The size of the price 
range is proportional to the size of the transaction costs.   When transaction 
costs are introduced, the supply and demand curves of the individual household 
take the form of a "reflected Y" diagram rather than the traditional "X" diagram.   
 
The effect of transaction costs on aggregated supply and demand is somewhat 
different because of variation across households.   Aggregate supply and 
demand become less elastic in the price range where transaction costs induce 
households to be self-sufficient.  This is because the self-sufficient households 
are unresponsive to small changes in market prices.  Even above and below the 
price range over which households are self-sufficient, the elasticities of supply 
and demand are affected by shifts in aggregate supply and demand that result 






This study revealed two somewhat unexpected results.  First, at high prices, 
transaction costs can make supply and demand more elastic.  The explanation is 
that in this price range few households are self-sufficient, but a given percentage 
change in the market price corresponds to a larger percentage change in the 
household shadow price.  Second, even when transaction costs make supply 
and demand less elastic, they will generally make the elasticity of marketed 
surplus larger.  This is because the partial of marketed surplus with respect to 
market price is approximately the same with and without transaction costs 
(differing only due to non-linearities in supply and demand), but the level of 
marketed surplus is smaller with transaction costs.   
 
Thus, efforts to improve transportation networks and reduce transaction costs will 
not only increase market participation, shifting supply outward, but they will make 
the supply and demand of food more responsive to changes in market prices.  
Although investment in transportation infrastructure will increase market  
surplus, it should not be expected to increase the elasticity of marketed surplus.  





6.  DISCUSSION 
 
The results presented in this paper are based on a simulation model, raising the 
question as to whether similar patterns would be found in real life.  The structure 
of the model itself is not controversial: it is based on standard assumptions of 
household behavior combined with conventional rules of spatial arbitrage.  
Furthermore, the model agrees with several stylized facts regarding food markets 
in developing countries: 1) that a significant proportion of rural households does 
not participate in food markets, 2) that market participation is lowest in the more 
remote areas, 3) that market participation is lowest for staples with low value/bulk 
ratios, and 4) that supply response is lower is the least developed countries and 
regions.   
 
Important questions remain, however.  What is the relative importance of 
transaction costs and risk
14 in motivating households not to participate in the 
market?   If risk is the dominant factor, then improving transportation 
infrastructure is less likely to increase supply responsiveness.  Also, to what 
degree does food self-sufficiency reduce the elasticity of supply and demand?  It 
is important to know not just the proportion of households that are self-sufficient, 
                                                       
14 Risk may be considered a type of transaction cost.  Here, however, we 
define transaction costs more narrowly to include only the expected value of the cost of 





but which households are self-sufficient.  Even if half of all rural households are 
self-sufficient, the impact on supply elasticities could be modest if they account 
for a small proportion of production, as would be the case in a country with a 
dualistic agricultural sector.   
 
We can identify at least four approaches that test empirically the results 
presented here. First, in cross-country studies of supply response, transportation 
infrastructure should be included both as a shifter and as an interaction term with 
price.  We expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be positive, suggesting 
that reducing transportation costs increases the responsiveness of supply to 
price.  Second, the supply response of different regions within a country to prices 
in a given market should be inversely related to the distance between the market 
and the region.  Third, supply response should be greater in regions and 
countries with a low proportion of self-sufficient households.  Fourth, the supply 
and demand elasticities obtained from aggregate data should be lower than 
those obtained from household data, provided that the latter uses some estimate 
of household-level shadow prices, taking into account the costs of buying and 
selling.   
 
Apart from empirical tests of the findings in this paper, a strong case can be 





incidence and determinants of household food self-sufficiency.  As part of this 
effort, it would be useful to develop and test methods for estimating the 
household shadow price as a function of observable variables.  
 
Finally, this study demonstrates that advances in software and solution 
algorithms make the incorporation of transaction costs into household models 
relatively simple.  This allows researchers to model farmer choices more 
realistically, particularly in situations where transaction costs are high such as in 
food markets in low-density developing countries.  Here, the method was used to 
model transaction costs in food marketing, but it can easily be applied to 
modeling imperfect labor markets, credit constraints, and other manifestations of 





4 Commodity balance 
 
 
5 Lower limit on shadow prices 
 
 
6 Upper limit on shadow prices 
 
 
mktsup   +   c   =   mktdem   +   q i i i i  
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qi  Output supply of or (negative) input demand for good i 
pi  Household shadow price for good i 
ci  Consumption of good i 
x  Full income  
mktdemi Market demand for good i 




Ei  Household endowment of good i 
pi
m  Market price for good i 
zm  Fixed factors of production 
t  Transaction cost 














































































Table 2 -Assumptions regarding demand elasticities for household model 
 
   













































































































Figure 1-Household supply and demand with transaction costs as a function of 














Figure 2: -Household supply and demand with transaction costs as a function of 










Figure 3-Household supply and demand as a function of market price and 







Figure 4-Aggregate supply and demand as a function of market price and 











Figure 5-Price elasticities of supply and demand as a function of market price 








Figure 6-Proportion of self-sufficient households as a function of market price 

















8.  REFERENCES 
 
Binswanger, H., M. Yang, and A. Bowers. 1985. "On the determinants of cross-
country aggregate agricultural supply." Journal of Econometrics 36: 111-
131.  
 
Bloom, D. and J. Sachs. 1998. "Geography, Demography, and Economic Growth 
in Africa." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity  (2).  
 
Brooke, A., D. Kendrick, and A. Meeraus. 1992. GAMS: A User Guide - Release 
2.25. Boyd and Fraser Publishing Company. Danvers, Massachusetts. 
 
Chibber, A. 1989. "The Aggregate Supply Response: A Survey."  In Commander, 
S. (ed.) Structural Adjustment and Agriculture: Theory and Practice in 
Africa and Latin America. Overseas Development Institute. London. 
 
de Janvry, A., M. Fafchamps, and E. Sadoulet. 1991. "Peasant Household 
Behavior with Missing Markets: Some Paradoxes Explained." Economic 
Journal. 101: 1400-17. 
 
de Janvry,  A. and E. Sadoulet. 1995. Quantitative Development Policy Analysis. 
The Johns Hopkins University Press. Baltimore. 
 
Jayne, T. 1994. "Do high food marketing costs constrain cash crop production? 







Löfgren, H. and S. Robinson, 1999. "To Trade or Not to Trade: Non-separable 
Farm Household Models in Partial and General Equilibrium." Trade and 
Macroeconomics Division Discussion Paper No. 37. International Food 
Policy Research Institute. Washington, D.C. 
 
Omamo, S. 1998. "Transport costs and smallholder cropping choices: An 
application to Siaya District, Kenya." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 80 (February): 116-123. 
 
Roe, T. and T. Graham-Tomasi. 1986. "Yield Risk in a Dynamic Model of the 
Agricultural Household." In Singh, I., L. Squire, and J. Strauss (eds.). 
1986. Agricultural Household Models: Extensions, Applications, and 
Policy. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Baltimore. 
 
Rutherford, T. 1995. "Extension of GAMS for Complementarity Problems Arising 
in Applied Economic Analysis." Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control. 19: 1299-1324. 
 
Singh, I., L. Squire, and J. Strauss (eds.). 1986. Agricultural Household Models: 
Extensions, Applications, and Policy. The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Baltimore. 
Yotopolous, P., L. Lau, and W.L. Lin. 1976. "Microeconomic Output Supply and 
Factor Demand Functions in the Agriculture of the Province of Taiwan." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 58: 333-40. 